In a world of
augmenting tensions and conflicting interests, the Tunisian Revolution in 2011
marked a new beginning, a revival of aspirations to a freer, more equitable
mode of government. However, the aftermath of this Revolution has clearly shown
the blatant political immaturity as well as the complex game of interests in
what we tend to think of as an emerging democracy. Key issues such as economic
recovery, social justice, cultural promotion and political discourse are being
avoided for their sensitivity and “potential threat” to “national unity.” Such
a pessimistic note shall not imply any sense of despair or lack of patriotic
fervor; we hereby express our disappointment and bitterness at the actual
situation in Tunisia, hoping for a quick and effective change.
The Revolution:
a Deliberate Misunderstanding:
How would one avoid
an embarrassing question? One of the ways to do so would be to pretend not to
have understood the question quite correctly. This is exactly what our
political elite have been attempting to achieve in various ways, though we
shall level much criticism at their mise-en-scène. The key issue at
stake here is whether the Revolution was primarily the outcome of social
ill-being or political oppression. Many of you would argue for a middle-ground
position and tell that both factors are inextricable. I wouldn’t object, but
I’d rather give some primacy to the social factor. The Revolution has
started in December 2010 as a collective cry out of – and I prefer to put it
bluntly – hunger. Hunger here is an umbrella term for the kinds of
social ills that come with poverty; lack of equal job opportunities, vulnerable
infrastructure, over-crowdedness in key suburban conglomerations, high crime
rates, to only name a few. Certainly, social reform cannot be successfully
implemented without a free political atmosphere and democratic, transparent
state institutions. However, the main concern of post-revolutionary governments
should be the socio-economic axis of politics for this would ease the tension
and the lack of trust between citizens and the State. Unfortunately, the
Tunisian political elite has got this message wrong and gave absolute primacy
to the quenching of their desire for political freedom at the expense of social
and economic reform. The Revolution has taken its toll on the economy without
any serious measures to lessen this impact. On the contrary, the public sector
did hire a staggering 100,000 people into its administrations in 2012. And
there lies all the trickery! While such a number should boost economic growth
figures by a good 2%, for a fake reassurance effect, this should put a great
deal of pressure on public spending and, consequently, push public debts to
worrying levels.
Ideology
Transfigured!
Apart
from their skilful avoidance of more central issues to the Tunisian context,
our political elite are to be given credit for their mastery of political
manipulation, especially in terms of ideological boundaries. As far as these
go, many Tunisian politicians would adopt an abolitionist discourse claiming
that there are no boundaries between right-wing and left-wing in Tunisia. Such
a spectrum is often denounced as alien, irrelevant to and blindly projected on
the Tunisian scene, its proponents are said to be heedless to the cultural
specificities of the country. However, such ideological demarcations are still
present, though implicit. This aspect often leaves room for much conceptual and
discursive perversity, and our politicians never fail to seize such
opportunities. Let us take the example of the current leading party in Tunisia
since 2014 – Nidaa Tounes. The initiative to found this party was taken by Béji
Caid-Essebsi in 2012 to counter-balance the expanding influence of Ennahdha.
Very intelligently, it presented itself as a progressive alternative to
the “archaic” views of the Islamist party. Therefore, Nidaa Tounes can be
easily mistaken for a left-wing party in this respect. It even cooperated with
the leftist opposition soon after the assassination of Mohamed Al-Brahmi in
July, 2013. These efforts led to the resignation of Ali Al-Arayedh’s government
and the replacement thereof by one made up of technocrats ahead of the
Legislative and Presidential Elections of 2014. This was quite sufficient to hide
a huge rise of conservatism in general, as the two biggest parties in Tunisia
are right-wing. While Ennahdha is a typical right-wing party, Nidaa Tounes
subtly ticks many boxes in the conservative checklist, adopting a discourse of
the Destourian past, displaying nationalistic attitudes along with liberal –
very liberal – economic views. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
both parties could form a coalition after the 2014 Elections.
Béji Caid-Essebsi, the mock-fatherly figure or the fossilized
vision of a leader:
One of the most
significant folkloric beliefs of the pre-Revolution era, thought to be gone, is
the lack of distinction between the President and the State. Both are generally
confounded for the Tunisian rendition of dictatorship revolves around
autocracy. This was especially the case with Habib Bourguiba’s three-decade presidency
(1957-1987). Bourguiba used to be viewed as the spiritual father of the Nation.
His legacy of resistance against the long-established French protectorate as
well as his leadership of Tunisian national forces prior to the Independence
had owned him much esteem since the early days of the Republic. The President
was beyond any divides within society; he used to serve as a unifying figure.
Nonetheless, it seems that we love this image and wish to preserve it. The
political changes after the Revolution are too unsettling for our taste and our
comfort zone of the past is ever so appealing! The Revolution took place for us
to freely choose a father figure! In fact, Béji Caid-Essebsi is to be given
credit for being incredibly smart and aware of the Tunisian perception of
things. Since the founding of Nidaa Tounes, Caid-Essebsi has worked quite a lot
on his public image, bringing back to our memories the whole iconographical
network woven around the image of President Bourguiba. The stature and costume of
the latter have been reproduced to the finest by Mr. Caid-Essebsi, drawing on
the extensive interaction that had been taking place between them since the
late 1950s. Be it out of nostalgia for the past or memories of the
woman-emancipating leader, the Tunisian unconscious mind saw in Béji
Caid-Essebsi the image of the statesman.
But a revolution,
after all, is in part a search for new meanings. These misconceptions reflect a
perfectly normal – if not healthy – state of affairs. The struggle for novel
conceptions of social and political being need – at one stage – some conceptual
redefinitions and questionings. The worrying part of it, however, is that such
convulsive periods do not result in any veritable change of attitudes; that
they result in permanent collective anxiety, instead.
Mohamed Ali Slama
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